Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.
The Engineering of Social Control: Policing and Technology
* Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA. E-mail: gmarx{at}mit.edu
Increased reliance on science and technology is central to contemporary developments in policing. The engineering of social control is not new. What is new is the scale, greater precision, continual invention and experimentation, and global connections. Technical means of social control saturate modern society, colonizing and documenting ever more areas of life. This article considers six ways of controlling the environment: target removal, target devaluation, target insulation, offender weakening or incapacitation, exclusion and offense/offender/target identification. Social and ethical implications involving goal conflicts, unintended consequences, displacement, neutralization, and escalation are considered.
A factor central to many contemporary developments in policing is the increased role of science and technology (Ericson and Shearing, 1986) which is used to manage police organizations, as well as control and prevent crime. In this article, I consider some aspects of the latter involving the effort to structure the environment strategically, reduce rule breaking, increase the identification of offenders and offenses and minimize harm. Rather than focusing on a particular crime control problem or an institutional setting such as courts or prisons, I will look more broadly at some of the issues involved in technology and social control. I emphasize norms, rather than other goals related to technology (e.g. the use of Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) in the allocation of police resources) and I am particularly interested in surveillance technologies that simultaneously offer so much promise and peril.
The increased prominence of social control via engineering is related to concerns arising from the scale, mobility, and anonymity of mass society. Ironically, increased expectations of, and protections for, privacy have furthered reliance on external, impersonal, distance-mediated, secondary technical means, and data-base memories that locate, identify, register, record, classify, and validate or generate grounds for suspicion. The perception of catastrophic risks in an interdependent world relying on complex technologies and the entrepreneurial efforts of the security industry and governments such as the United States, have helped spread the technologies internationally. There is ample scope here for conflict of interest between agents and subjects of social control that highlight the centrality of human rights issues.
Engineering of social control is not new. What is new is the scale and relatively greater scientific precision, continual invention and experimentation, and rapid global diffusion. Technical means of control saturate modern society, colonizing and documenting ever more areas of life. The roots of contemporary social control lie in the development of large organizations and standardized control technologies. (Beniger, 1986, Weber, 1964, Rule, 1973, Foucault, 1977, Cohen, 1985, Laudon, 1986, Gandy 1993, Zuboff, 1988, Lyon, 1994, Shenhav, 1999).
The use of contemporary technologies that exert control by manipulating the dispositions of individuals and the environment they inhabit contrasts with traditional approaches in which authorities become involved only after a violation occurs. Rather than attention to the offender's consciousness or will, the emphasis may be, literally, on restricting or lessening the subject's ability to deviate by engineering away that choice by altering the physical environment to make particular violations difficult or impossible to carry out and those that involve various exclusionary and early- identification preventive efforts. The historically important and uncertain reliance on the will and choice of the violator are sidestepped with many contemporary efforts. Because, apart from the ethical issues, messing with the human will can be expensive and the outcomes uncertain, finding technical means for making the violation impossible may seem preferable from the control perspective. Soft control includes low visibility or invisible techniques and is often built into the environment, not being perceived as a form of control. It may be part of the process as when a cell phone shows its location when turned on, or software that is password protected or that monitors work–such as the number of keystrokes entered on a computer.
Whilst these developments may represent an enhanced version of medieval fortification, it increasingly coexists with decentralized, remote, low visibility forms of management and manipulation. The new surveillance is a central factor in discovering and communicating (often silently and remotely) previously unseen personal information and merging this with additional sources of data for social control and other purposes (Marx, 1988). In the 19th century soft control appealed to the mind of the offender and sought transformation of the soul (Foucault, 1977). Its contemporary counterpart appeals to the offender's reason and conscience through the increasing costs of violation, the marketing of pro-social ideas and efforts to build community, creating positive peer relations, and applying various types of therapy. Appeals to actors for a particular kind of behavior, such as volunteering to be searched or offering their social security number or other personal information, whether as a sign of good citizenship or for some reward, also reflect soft control.
I consider, below, six ways of controlling the environment. These emphasize either protection of the victimor alteration of what is desired by the violation, or an emphasis on making it impossible or more difficult for the offender.
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Target removal
The logic of prevention is clearest and most effective here. Something that is not there cannot be taken. The move toward a cashless society is one example. Merchants who only accept credit or debit cards, or whose registers never have more than a modest amount of cash, are unlikely to be conventionally robbed. Furniture built into the wall cannot be stolen. Subway and bus exteriors built with graffiti resistant metals are hard to draw upon. Requiring methadone to be consumed in front of an observer prevents it being resold. Through software programming, computers and telephones can be blocked from sending or receiving messages to, or from, selected locations.
Target devaluation
The goal is to reduce or eliminate the value of a potential target of predation to anyone but authorized users. The target remains, but its uselessness (or the greater risks and challenges involved in carrying out the violation) makes it unattractive to predators. Examples include telephones, computers, automobiles and even guns that are increasingly available which can only be used with access devices such as a unique biometric identifier (e.g. retinal, voice or geometric hand pattern), card or access code. Related examples are reducing the desirability (or at least identifiability) of a victim or an environment. Consider advice to women to dress in a nonprovocative fashion, or note the tactic adopted by some malls to deter teenagers from congregating by playing classical music.
Target insulation
With this ancient technique of fortification the object of desire remains, but it is protected, most notably in high security, gated communities in which access and egress are carefully controlled.
Offender weakening or incapacitation
This classic strategy seeks to render potential offenders harmless with respect to the will, or ability, to violate the norm in question or to escape. The means may act directly on the body by permanently altering it and making certain offences impossible—literal or chemical castration for sex offenders or cutting off the hands of thieves. Passivity, disorientation, or the inability to flee may be created by sensory weapons, tranquilizers, and other medications such as Depo-Provera or psycho-surgery for the violent. A variety of nonlethal disorienting, stopping, restraining, or blocking devices from electrical, chemical, and acoustical (percussive weaponry) immobilizers to sensory deprivation devices (e.g. tasers, pepper spray, loud music, flash bang devices, sticky foam released on a floor, straight jackets, and a net fired over a disruptive person) are available. As a means of influence these can be related to subliminal environmental efforts involving smells, architectural design, wall color, furniture shape and music in work and shopping settings.1
Related efforts deal not with the body of the offender but with the instrumentalities and/or the environment involved in the offence. The goal is to render useless or unavailable something that is essential for the violation, for example, limiting gun purchases to those who have undergone computer checks for purchase eligibility (e.g. no felony conviction), removing phone booths from areas frequented by drug dealers, placing spikes in the road to stop a fleeing vehicle, or using a transmitter (whether attached beforehand or fired at the vehicle) that permits tracking location.
Exclusion
Potential offenders have traditionally been kept away from targets or tempting environments by exile, prison, or curfew and by place or activity exclusions (e.g. places where alcohol is sold for juveniles).
The availability of massive personal databases on so many aspects of an individual's life—whether involving arrest or credit records, magazines subscribed to, or charities donated to—offers a rich potential for background checks and categorization. A variety of risk classification systems are available. Vetting may be legally mandated as in records check for those working with children and those seeking various kinds of licenses.
A related technology is electronic monitoring or location devices based on GPS. In one form alarms go off and messages are sent to authorities if an adjudicated person wearing a transmitter gets too close to a prohibited person or area or leaves an area he is restricted to. This banning of access or a protected environment is the functional equivalent of the exclusion found in other means (perimeter or border maintaining) such as walls, fences, or moats.
Determining exclusion andinclusion and entrance and egress requires criteria against which individuals are to be judged. This surveillance can involve checking for required eligibility tokens, symbols, and characteristics. Or it can involve tests, measurements, and monitoring to create a data-based characterization of the individual, which can be compared to broad statistical models that claim to predict behavior, at least in the aggregate. Those fitting the profile are excluded from vulnerable locations, activities, and so on.
Even when the above forms are unsuccessful, the surveillance goal of documentation may result in evidence and can permit identifying and apprehending the violators, strategically allocating resources for crime mapping, suggesting where to place video cameras and police patrols. Early warning here is linked (often in automated fashion) to preventive actions. An alarm is sent and this triggers defensive actions to stop or limit damage such as closing a gate.
Offense/offender/target identification
Where it is not actually possible to prevent the violation physically, or where that is too expensive, it may be possible to at least deter it because of the increased likelihood of apprehension. When that does not happen, authorities may know that a violation is occurring or has occurred, who are responsible, and where they are to be found. Alarms can send a message to the perpetrator who may desist, as well as to authorities who may be able to intervene to minimize harm or apprehend a suspect. For perimeter security virtual fences use radar sensors, which identify and track the movement of outsiders meter by meter, sending images and locational information.
Major goals for an identification strategy are to increase visibility for (and often of) control agents, to document the occurrence of an event, and identify the violator or goods taken. A central concern of 19th century forensic science was to develop reliable biometric measures of identity based on the analysis of fingerprints, facial measurements, and chemical properties (Thorwald, 1965). Architectural design emphasizing visibility as a deterrent fits here (Newman, 1972), as do improved street and building lighting. Video, audio, motion, and heat detection means and access codes that are presumed to document who enters an area, or is using a resource such as a computer, also fit here. Hand-activated personal alarm systems, or a luggage alarm that goes off if a purse or suitcase is illegitimately moved or opened and the electronic tagging of consumer items or expensive tools at work, which give off an alarm if wrongly removed, are other examples. Items with indelible markings, devices pinpointing the time and place of a gun shot sound and cameras recording speeders and red light violations are related examples.
The ability to use mechanical means of identification may be required by law. Thus consider the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (‘CALEA’) of the United States which requires high tech industries and organizations involved in telephone and internet communication to use equipment that must be manufactured so it is readily amenable to wire tapping.2
New information technologies have made it possible not only to watch everyone, but for everyone to be a watcher. This greater ease of mobilizing the law by involving citizens in social control is one characteristic of the Anglo-American police tradition, although not in the rest of Europe. Citizens are encouraged to use hot lines to report infractions (e.g. erratic highway drivers, drug dealing, poaching or ’whistle-blowing’ regarding organizational malfeasance) via cell and traditional telephones and e-mail.
Adjudicated persons may also be required to participate by identifying themselves (e.g. in the U.S. Megan's law). This is equivalent to historical visible stigma examples such as the scarlet letter of the adulterer. The police use mass communications media to help identify and locate wanted persons via information on web cites and crime re-enactments on television.
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The reasons for using science and technology in criminal justice contexts are obvious. It would be irresponsible not to seek benefit from technical developments. There are many successful applications in specific contexts such as in parking lots and in traffic enforcement (Clarke, 1997). Yet such applications must be accompanied by careful analysis and attention to social and ethical implications that may be overlooked, given the sense of urgency about a problem and what is often the self-justifying tunnel rhetoric of those offering solutions. I next consider some less desirable aspects that may appear. Awareness of such factors calls for caution and sometimes midterm corrections, limitations, or suspension of a tactic. But it is certainly not a call to cease innovation or the search for better solutions.
However ideal a technical control system may appear in the abstract from the viewpoint of those advocating it, or successful in the short run, the world of application is often much messier and more complicated than the public relations efforts in initially selling it suggest. Tradeoffs, negative externalities, and unanticipated outcomes are often present.3 There is rarely a perfect, or cost free, technical fix (if nothing else, a given choice is likely to involve using resources that might have gone elsewhere). The technology's narrowing of focus on a given problem may come at the cost of failing to see larger systemic contexts, alternatives, and longer-range consequences. The complexity and fluidity of human situations makes this a rich area for the study of trade-offs, irony, and paradox. In some cases there are parallels to iatrogenetic medical practices in which one problem is cured, but at the cost of creating another.
Technical efforts to insure conformity may be hindered by many factors.
Goal conflicts
Consider the possible tension between values, such as the tension between custody and punishment against care and some form of rehabilitation (Rhodes, 2004). When more intensive mechanical control, whether within the prison or the community, comes (as it often does), it does so with a diminution of human contact and help in the efforts to overcome the social and personal deficits which contribute to violations. Short term gains in control may come at the cost of longer term losses.4 (Byrne et al., forthcoming)
We want both liberty and order. We value the right to know, but also the right to control personal information. We seek privacy and often anonymity, but we also know that secrecy can hide dastardly deeds and that visibility can bring accountability. But too much visibility may inhibit experimentation, creativity, and risk taking and can lead to permanent stigmatization and the wrongful denial of opportunity. In our media-saturated societies we want to be seen and to see, yet also to be left alone.
But we can also look more concretely at goal conflicts in the immediate situation. Thus barriers need to keep out those who are uninvited, while making it easy for those contained within to leave in the case of an emergency: bars over windows may keep out thieves, but also prevent occupants from escaping in the event of a fire. Encryption of information offers security, but at increased expense and increasing the time required for a transaction.
Unintended consequences
Situations involving unexpected and unwanted results offer a rich area for analysis (Merton, 1957, Sieber, 1982, Marx, 1981). I refer here to the immediate consequences of an intervention that are not immediately anticipated.
It may be difficult to limit the impact of a technology. Terms such as blowback, collateral damage, backfire, and overshooting the target capture this. Thus some techniques that immobilize suspects may do the same for control agents. Uncontrollable wind patterns may send tear gas to places where it is not directed (including back on controllers who need to be protected). Enhanced lighting and lines of visibility can help perpetrators identify victims or control agents, as well as the reverse. Conversely, a protective device can lock everyone out if the keys or encryption codes are lost. The removal of benches from public areas denies the homeless, as well as others, a place to sit.
There may be second order effects. Thus in their initial use, barrier strips intended to stop fleeing cars, almost instantly released the air in the tire, sometimes causing high speed crashes. Changes to tires and the strips resulting in slower air release have reduced this. Those publicly identified as sex offenders may face vigilante attacks. Enhanced technical enforcement along the US-Mexican border has led to immigrants using more dangerous desert routes with an increase in mortality (Cornelius, 2001).
An intervention may interact with other conditions to produce an undesired outcome. Thus pepper spray, intended as a nonlethal alternative, may pose a risk to those with severe asthma or other respiratory problems(Hummer this volume).
There may be long-term health consequences that are not immediately visible. Questions have been raised for example about the effect of repeated exposure to radiation from x-ray search machines, including for traffic officers using radar detection devices.
Displacement
Several forms of displacement can be noted involving place, time, type of offence, and offender (Reppetto, 1976, Norris et al., 1998). Issues of displacement are central to many control settings where there are conflicts of interest and where rule breakers, having some resources, find ways to beat control efforts. This can involve issues of equity as well. If relatively effective technical solutions are commercialized, such as gated communities to keep out would-be thieves, lower income communities or individuals may be unable to afford an effective innovation and hence experience an increase in predation.
Another form of displacement involves the appearance of derivative offences. The discovery that a target has been rendered useless to an offender may increase violence, whether as a resource to gain the needed access, or out of frustration. For example, the appearance of ’car-jacking’ is related to more sophisticated antitheft devices on cars.
We also see new kinds of violation related to the technology. Authorities may respond with new laws that criminalize the possession of artefacts or activities designed to thwart enforcement. These are forms of secondary deviance involving procedural violations, having nothing directly to do with the primary social control goal. These artifactual legal accretions are a rarely studied contributor to the expansion of law seen in recent decades. In many jurisdictions it is a crime to possess a radar detector that identifies use of police radar in traffic enforcement. The guilty face charges for the secondary offence of possession, even if they were not speeding. Or consider the new secondary violation that can be called behavior unbecoming a shopper (BUS). In the less than brave world of the shopping mall, BUS can involve walking a dog or lounging. In the research by McCahill (2002) the video observation of such activities mobilized corrective action by guards.
Neutralization and escalation
Whether out of self-interested rule breaking, principled rebellion, or human contrariness, individuals can be very creative in neutralizing systems of control. This may lead to more sophisticated offending and its control, but not fundamentally alter the conflict between rule breakers and rule enforcers. A number of behavioral techniques of neutralization—strategic moves by which subjects of surveillance seek to subvert the collection of personal information—can be noted.5 A variety of means are available for beating drug tests—from contaminating the urine with bleach on one's hand to using a catheter to insert drug-free urine into the body. (Tunnell, 2004) Police use of radar detectors against speeders was soon followed by antiradar detectors and subsequently a means for the police to identify the latter.
When systems cannot be technically defeated, as with very sophisticated encryption, then their human context may be compromised, whether through coercion or deception. For example, thieves can access valuable repositories by holding hostage the relatives of those with authorized access, or even seducing them.
New control techniques may be turned against control agents. While authorities may have an initial advantage, this is often short lived. Thus more powerful armor, bullet proof vests and sophisticated communication systems are no longer the sole property of the police, but an escalating domestic arms race.
Meaning
Evaluation research is important to assess the validity and reliability of technical solutions. Given the expense and the importance of the problems, there is relatively little research on many of the techniques.6 Results may be invalid for many reasons—a less than perfect technique (the polygraph), poor implementation, improper application, distorting environmental factors (e.g. diet or prescription drugs or neutralization means that can interfere with accurate drug tests).7
Yet even in the best of cases, an empirically valid result does not guarantee a socially meaningful result. Thus a DNA match between material from a crime scene and a suspect cannot reveal if a death resulted from a homicide or self-defence. The sample might have been planted or a secure chain of evidence custody not maintained. A computer match between persons on welfare and those with bank accounts may reveal a person over the savings limits, but that is not proof of cheating since funds may be held in trust for a funeral—something legally permitted—but not built into the computer program. Audio and video recordings may reflect what was done and said, but will not necessarily reveal why, or what a suspect intended. Seeing should not automatically mean believing.
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The overselling of technical solutions may exaggerate risk and vulnerability, engendering immobilizing fear and an unduly suspicious and untrusting society. Or we may see the opposite. An unexamined faith in a tactic's fail-safe nature can lead to complacency and a false sense of security in which individuals are lulled into not taking other necessary precautions.
Documentation of all infractions may overload the control system. This may lower morale among enforcers who feel overwhelmed and since resources for acting on all the information may not be available, authorities may also face charges of discriminatory enforcement. This again touches the issue of discretion and in broadening the documented pool of violations/violators authorities may feel compelled to take action in cases they feel it would be best to ignore.
Even if adequate resources for full enforcement action were available, organizational effectiveness could be harmed. Automatic technical solutions developed without adequate appreciation of complexity and contingency run the risk of eliminating the discretion, negotiation, compromise, and informal understandings that are often central to morale and the effective working of organizations (Dalton, 1959, Goffman, 1961). The rigidity of the machine and limited possibilities for immediate innovations, while advantageous for some purposes, may be severe limitations in others.
Even if technical solutions could somehow be effective in eliminating all rule breaking, we must none-the-less ask, ’Where might this lead and what kind of a society are we creating?’ In the United States a future radically at odds with the nation's higher ideals is not likely to come by cataclysmic change, but gradually, in a thousand little ways, each perhaps understandable, but in totality, creating a very different world—a world arrived at by accretion ‘under the radar’, rather than through public dialogue.
For a variety of historical and legitimacy creating reasons, soft ways have become more prominent since the appearance of the modern democratic nation state and this trend has accelerated in recent decades.8 However attractive, the tendency toward softer means can be beguiling. It is hard to say ’no’ if you are unaware of what is going on. Just because behavior can be guided or personal data can be collected relatively silently, noninvasively, and often seductively, it is not justified, apart from the goals and the procedure used to develop the policy. The very soft, nonproblematic nature of many modern technologies may take attention away from other aspects. 9
In considering less invasive technical means, we need to be mindful that these come with the potential of vastly expanding the pool of those subject to social control.
Expanded nets and thinned meshes are a function of perceived threats and degrees of risk, as well as ease of application. The seemingly ever greater ease and efficiency offered by technological means of surveillance are on a collision course with traditional notions of liberty rooted in concepts of ‘reasonable suspicion’, and the like.
The increased use of sophisticated information and other kinds of technology often require government to turn to the private sector. This has resulted in unprecedented levels of the privatization or hybridization of forms of social control that traditionally were more exclusively in the public domain and it risks lessened public accountability. Note the vast expansion of companies offering homeland security products: in the United States in 2003 there were 3,512 companies with homeland security contracts; by 2006 the number was 33,890. This sector has become a formidable lobby: in 2001 there were two registered homeland security lobbying firms and by 2005 there were 543 (Harris, 2006). What are the implications of this for the public interest and for careful analysis of risks and the effectiveness of the solutions sold? The public goal of justice and the private goal of profit are uneasy bedfellows, requiring a high degree of transparency and accountability.
The search for stand-alone mechanical solutions also avoids the need to ask why some individuals break the rules and points away from examining the social conditions, which may contribute to violations and the possibility of changing those conditions, rather than changing the individual. Technical solutions seek to by-pass the need to create consensus and a community in which individuals act responsibly as a result of voluntary commitment to the rules, not because they have no choice or only out of fear of reprisals. This emphasis can further social neglect and subsequent problems, leading to calls for more intensive and extensive reliance on technology in a seemingly endless self-re-enforcing spiral.
There is a magisterial, legitimacy-granting aura around both law and science Ericson and Shearing, 1986). Technological controls, presumably being science based, are justified as valid, objective, neutral, universal, consensual, and fair. They certainly can be. Yet we need to be mindful of the fact that tools and results are socially created and interpreted (and thus potentially disputable) and exist in dynamic interdependent systems where interests may conflict, inequality is often present and where full impacts may be difficult to envision. Critical inquiry and humility are as necessary as innovation and experimentation.
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This article draws from and builds upon Marx (1995; 2001). These and related articles are at garymarx.net. A slightly different version will appear in Byrne, J. (ed.). The New Technology of Crime, Law and Social Control, forthcoming.
1 These efforts share the soft emphasis of modern direct appeals, which play to the presumed rational choice and consciousness of subjects in gaining their cooperation. Yet, as with traditional hard coercive means, they are involuntary. The moral manipulation relies on the unnoticeable (or taken for granted) elements of the environment to influence the person's behavior, bypassing cooperation with self awareness. 
2 In the private sector compliance is generally compelled not through legislation, but by the threat of service denial. Consider, for example, requirements that condition receiving insurance by meeting carefully defined physical security, licensing, and bonding standards. Note also the lower premiums offered to car and home owners who have various security devices.
3 In considering crime prevention and means beyond just technology Grabosky (1996) offers a useful conceptualization involving crime escalation, displacement, over deterrence, and perverse incentives. The failure of programs is explained by bad science and planning and deficiencies in implementation that can involve lack of resources or coordination.
4 Even in the most extreme settings control may be limited. Note Rhodes (2004) consideration of feces flinging by those maximally excluded from human interaction, let alone rehabilitative efforts, in maximum security settings. She writes, '...the tighter control becomes, the more problematic are the effects it precipitates.’ (p.4)
5 Among forms noted in Marx (2003) are: direct refusal, discovery, avoidance, switching, distorting, counter-surveillance, cooperation, blocking, and masking.
6 In the case of surveillance technologies such as drug testing, little is known about their effectiveness. The paucity of independent studies of drug testing is noteworthy. Much of the federally mandated testing has a ritual quality in simply being in response to a requirement for contracts and other funding. (American Management Association, 1999, Tunnell 2004).
7 This of course applies to nonhumans as well. Accurate drug tests for race horses for example can be distorted by poppy seeds, alfalfa, jimson weed, and human sweat among other factors. (Tobin)
8 With enlightenment and the rise of the democratic nation state with social and economic rights and a consumer economy, legitimacy and social order are in principle based on the consent and choices of the citizen, rather than the sheer coercive power of elites.
9 In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Brandeis wrote, ’Experience should teach us to be most on our guard when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.’ The same sentiment can be applied to means that are soft and seemingly noninvasive. These issues are considered in more detail in Marx (2006a).
Less invasive means come with the threat of vastly expanding the pool of those who are watched (and of course as the Texas judge reportedly said,’if you hang them all you will certainly get the guilty.’ Expanded nets and thinned meshes are a function of perceived threats and degrees of risk, as well as ease of application. The seemingly ever greater ease and efficiency offered by technological means are on a collision course with traditional liberty protecting ideas of reasonable suspicion and minimization and impracticality.
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